Abstract. Recently several authors have stressed and illustrated the importance of including a second kind of negation (explicit negation) in logic programs besides \negation as failure", and its use in deductive databases, knowledge representation, and nonmonotonic reasoning. By introducing explicit negation into logic programs contradiction may appear. In this work we present two approaches for dealing with contradiction, and show their equivalence. One of the approaches consists in avoiding contradiction, and is based on restrictions in the adoption of abductive hypotheses. The other approach consists in removing contradiction, and is based on a transformation of contradictory programs into noncontradictory ones, guided by the reasons for contradiction. The work is divided into two parts: one is presented in this paper, and comprises the contradiction avoidance approach, and the other in 16] in this volume, comprises the contradiction removal approach and shows the equivalence between the avoidance and removal approaches.
Introduction
Recently several authors have stressed and illustrated the importance of including a second kind of negation in logic programs besides \negation as failure", and its use in deductive databases, knowledge representation, and nonmonotonic reasoning 9, 12, 13, 14, 10, 18, 19, 20, 27] .
Proposals for extending logic programming semantics with a second negation have been advanced. One is the Answer Sets semantics 9], shown to be an extension of the Stable Model semantics 8] of normal logic programs. In 13] a similar extension proposal was introduced, based also on stable models, where an implicit preference between negative information (exceptions) over positive one is assumed. However, answer sets semantics is not well founded. The meaning of the program, de ned as the intersection of all answer sets, is known to be computationally expensive. Yet another extension to include a second negation is suggested by Przymusinski in 24] . Though the intersection of models identi ed by this extension is a model and enjoys the well founded property, it gives less intuitive results 2] with respect to the coexistence of both forms of negation.
Well Founded Semantics with Explicit Negation (WFSX) 15], which we prefer, is an extension of the Well Founded Semantics 26] to include a second negation : called explicit negation, that preserves well foundedness and procedural properties. Explicit negation is characterized by that, whatever the objective literal L, whenever :L holds not L does too (Coherence Principle), and so L is false, thus avoiding the less intuitive results mentioned.
Once the new negation is introduced contradiction may arise (e.g. when L
and :L both hold) and no meaning is assigned 2 . While for some programs this seems reasonable (e.g. P = fa ; :a g), for others this is too strong.
Example 1. Consider the statements: Birds not shown to be abnormal y; Tweety is a bird and does not y; Socrates is a man; naturally expressed by the program:
fly(X) bird(X); not abnormal(X) :fly(tweety) bird(tweety) man(socrates) None of the above mentioned semantics assign a meaning to this program. Intuitively however, we should at least be able to say that Socrates is a man and tweety is a bird: It is also reasonable to conclude it doesn't fly, since the fact stating that it doesn't fly makes a stronger statement than the rule concluding it flies because not abnormal. The latter relies on accepting an assumption of nonabnormality, enforced by the closed world assumption treatment of the negation as failure involving the abnormality predicate. Indeed, whenever an assumption supports a contradiction it seems logical to be able to take the assumption back in order to prevent it {\reductio ad absurdum" or \reasoning by contradiction".
The scenario semantics paradigm of logic programs 6] has been recently expanded in 1] to encompass extended logic program, including WFSX, built upon simple primitive notions, such as those of \scenario" (a program plus a set of NAF-hypotheses), \acceptability of a hypothesis wrt to a scenario" (i.e. without contrary evidence), \evidence contrary to a hypothesis" (i.e. that contradicts it), \admissible scenario" (i.e. all its hypotheses are acceptable), \completeness of a set of hypotheses wrt to a scenario" (i.e. contains all acceptable hypotheses), etc.
1] presents semantics more sceptical than WFSX, thus avoiding contradiction in cases where the latter gives no meaning to a program. For example, the semantics WFS0, whose precise details are not relevant here, assigns to the above program the meaning (with obvious abbreviations for constants): fman(s); :fly(t); bird(t); not fly(t)g which corresponds to intuition 3 .
2
Other researchers have de ned paraconsistent semantics for contradictory programs 5, 3, 25, 28] . This is not our concern. On the contrary, we wish to remove contradiction whenever it rests on withdrawable assumptions.
Furthermore, there is motivation to consider semantics even more sceptical than WFS0, in which some acceptable hypotheses might not be adopted in complete scenarios. For instance, the acceptance of a hypothesis may be conditional upon the equal acceptance of another. This is typical of hypothesizing faults in a device or program debugging, whenever causally deeper faults are to be preferred over faults that are simply a consequence of the deeper ones: the former cannot be hypothesized without the latter 21, 22] . Problem speci c and user de ned preference criteria a ecting acceptance of hypotheses is another instance. In general, the rules of a logic program may be seen as providing a causal directionality of inference, similar to physical causality directionality, so that a distinction can sometimes be drawn about the primacy of one hypothesis over another (cf. 11, 4] In order to respond to such epistemological requirements, we begin by introducing into the complete scenario semantics of 1] the more exible notion of optative acceptance of hypotheses. In a complete scenario, optative hypotheses, or optatives, might or might not be accepted even if acceptable. On the other hand, non-optative hypotheses must be accepted if acceptable.
First we make no restriction on the optatives, and consider them provided by the user along with the program. Then we proceed to consider the issue of inferring optative hypotheses from the program, given speci c criteria. In particular we show how to infer optatives when the criterion is those hypotheses that do not depend on any other.
As pointed out in 17], these more sceptical semantics model rational reasoners who assume the program absolutely correct and so, whenever confronted with an acceptable hypothesis leading to an inconsistency cannot accept it; i.e. they prefer to assume the program correct rather than assume that an acceptable hypothesis must perforce be accepted.
WFSX models less sceptical reasoners who, confronted with an inconsistent scenario, prefer considering the program wrong rather than admitting that an acceptable hypothesis be not accepted. Such a reasoner is more con dent in his acceptability criterion: an acceptable hypothesis is accepted once and for all; if an inconsistency arises then there is certainly a problem with the program, not with the individual acceptance of each acceptable hypothesis. If the problem is with the program then its revision is in order. This view position can be justi ed if we think of a program as resulting from the assimilation of knowledge into a previous one.
In 12], Kowalski presents a detailed exposition of assimilation processes in various cases, and he claims the notion of integrity constraint is needed in logic programming for knowledge processing, representation, and assimilation. The problem of inconsistency arises from nonsatisfaction of the integrity constraints. If some new knowledge can be shown incompatible with the existing theory and integrity constraints, a revision process is needed to restore satisfaction of those constraints.
In extended logic programming we can view the requirement of non-contradiction as integrity constraint satisfaction, where constraints are denials of the form L; :L: Consequently we extend logic programs with integrity constraints in the form of denials.
Let's go back to example 1, and view the program as the result of adding to the previous knowledge the fact that tweety doesn't y. According to WFSX the resulting program is inconsistent. One way of restoring consistency would be to add a rule stating that ab(tweety) cannot be false, viz. assuming so would lead directly to contradiction: ab(tweety) not ab(tweety): The resulting program is now non-contradictory and its WFSX contains: fman(s); :fly(t); bird(t); not fly(t)g which corresponds to intuition. This work is divided into two parts. In this part we present a sceptical semantics which avoids contradiction for extended logic programs plus integrity contraints in the form of denials, based on the notion of optative hypotheses {an abductive approach. In the second part of this work, in 16], we de ne a program revision method for removing contradiction from contradictory programs under WFSX, based on the notion of revisable hypotheses {a belief revision approach{ and show the equivalence between the contradiction avoidance semantics and the WFSX of revised programs obtained by contradiction removal. Proofs of all theorems are omitted for brevity, but exist in an extended version of this work. A program P with semantics SEM satis es the integrity rules i P 6 j = SEM ?:
3 Contradiction Avoidance
Next we present a semantics more sceptical than WFS0, based on the notion of scenarios presented in 1]. We begin by brie y reviewing some concepts presented there and needed in the sequel.
De nition 1. A scenario of an extended logic program P is the rst order Horn theory P H; where the set of default literals H not H are the scenario hypotheses.
When introducing explicit negation into logic programs one has to consider its relation to the notion of default negation. When a scenario P H`:A 4 it is explicitly stating that A is false in that scenario. Thus the hypothesis not A must be enforced in the scenario, and cannot optionally be held independently.
De nition 2. The set of mandatory hypotheses wrt a scenario P H is:
A scenario P H of a program with integrity rules IC is consistent i :
An extended logic program P with integrity constraints IC is consistent i it has some consistent scenario.
N.B. From now on, unless otherwise stated, we restrict programs to consistent ones only. 4 The rather straightforward formal de nition of`; where each (ground) not L is treated as a new propositional symbol not L; and each (ground) :L is treated as a new propositional symbol : L; can be found in 1]. Intuitively,`is just the standard T P operator of the Horn propositional programs obtained with the new symbols in place. 5 The rule not L :L amounts to the \coherence principle" of 15].
Not every consistent scenario speci es a consensual semantics for a program 23]. For example 6] the program P = fp not qg has a consistent scenario P fnot pg which fails to give the intuitive meaning of P: It is not consensual to assume not p since there is the possibility of p being true (if not q is assumed), and :p is not explicitly stated (if this were the case then not q could not be assumed).
Intuitively, a hypothesis can be assumed only if there can be no evidence to the contrary. Clearly a hypotheses not L is only contradicted by the objective literal L: Evidence for an objective literal L in a program P is any set of hypotheses which, if assumed in P; would derive L: As in 6], a hypothesis is acceptable wrt a scenario i any evidence to the contrary is defeated by the scenario:
De nition 3. E not H is evidence for objective literal L (and against not L) in P i P E Mand(E)`L 6 , and we say P E defeats not L: If P is understood and E is evidence for L we write E ; L:
A hypothesis not L is acceptable wrt the scenario P H i 8E : E ; L ) 9not A 2 E j P H Mand(H)`A i.e. in each evidence against not L there is a hypothesis defeated by P H:
Whenever P is understood, the set of acceptable hypotheses wrt P H is denoted by Acc(H):
In a consensual semantics we are interested in admitting only consistent scenarios whose hypotheses are either acceptable or mandatory.
De nition 4. A scenario P H is admissible i it is consistent and

Mand(H) H Mand(H) Acc(H)
Based on this notion, in 1] some more or less sceptical semantics are dened. Here we review the complete scenario semantics, which has been proven equivalent to WFSX there.
De nition 5. A scenario P H is complete i it is em consistent, and for each
where (i) and (ii) simply express admissibility. In other words, a scenario P H is complete i H = Mand(H) Acc(H):
The complete scenarios semantics of P is the set of all complete scenarios of P: As usual, the meaning of P is determined by the intersection of all such scenarios. 6 The consistency of P E is not required (cf. 6]); e.g. P fnot Hg`H is allowed.
If every acceptable hypothesis must be accepted some programs might have no meaning (viz. example 1). In WFS0 some acceptable hypotheses are not accepted in order to avoid inconsistency. However, as shown in example 2, WFS0 allows no control over which acceptable hypotheses are not accepted. Conceivably, any acceptable hypothesis may or may not actually be accepted, in some discretionary way.
It is clear from example 2 that we wish to express that only the hypotheses not broken spokes; not leaky valve; not faulty dynamo and not punctured tube may be optative, i.e. to be possibly accepted or not, if acceptable. The acceptance of hypotheses like not flat tyre is to be determined solely by the acceptance of other hypotheses, and so we always wish them accepted once acceptable.
Thus we should distinguish between optative hypotheses (or optatives) and non-optative ones. Optative hypotheses are those in some pre-de ned Opt not H: That distinction made, we can conceive of scenarios that might not be complete wrt optatives, but are still complete wrt non-optatives: i.e. scenarios which contain all acceptable hypotheses except for possibly optative ones.
In general, when some acceptable optative hypothesis not L is not accepted, then some otherwise acceptable hypotheses become unacceptable:
Example 3. Let P = fp not a; a b; ? pg where Opt = fnot bg:
In our notion of optative, if not b is not accepted then not a is unacceptable, i.e. if optative b is not assumed false, the possibility of being true must be considered and so a cannot be assumed false; P fbg`a counts as evidence against not a:
De nition 6. A hypothesis not L is acceptable wrt scenario P H and optatives Opt i not L is acceptable 7 both wrt P H and P H F; where F is the set of facts not ((Opt \Acc(H))?H); i.e. F is the set of complements of acceptable Opts wrt H which are not in H (that is which were not accepted).
Acc Opt (H) denotes the set of acceptable hypotheses wrt P H and Opt:
Example 4. In example 3 Acc Opt (fnot pg) = fg: not b is not acceptable because, even though acceptable wrt P fnot pg; it is not acceptable wrt P fnot pg fbg 8 .
The same happens with not a: With this more general notion of acceptability scenarios may be partially complete; i.e. complete wrt non-optatives, but possibly not complete wrt optatives (condition (iii) below):
De nition 7. A scenario P H is a complete scenario wrt a set of optatives Opt i it is consistent, and for each not L : It is clear some of these scenarios are over-sceptical, in the sense that they fail to accept more optatives than need be to avoid contradiction. For example in the rst scenario, in order to avoid contradiction none of the optatives were accepted. This occurs because no condition of maximal acceptance of optatives was enforced.
In order to impose this condition we begin by identifying, for each complete scenario wrt Opt; those optatives that though acceptable were not accepted.
De nition 8. Let P H be a complete scenario wrt Opt: The avoidance set of P H is (Opt \ Acc(H)) ? H: Example 6. The avoidance set of the rst scenario in example 5 is fnot lv; not pt; not fdg and of the second one is fnot lv; not ptg:
In keeping with the scepticism vocation of WFSX, consider those scenarios which, for some given avoidance set, are minimal. fnot :ww; not fd; not bs; not lvg fnot :ww; not fd; not bs; not ptg fnot :ww; not fd; not lv; not pt; not ftg These correspond to minimal faults compatible with the wobbly wheel observation, i.e. the ways of avoiding contradiction (inevitable if Opt were fg) by minimally not accepting acceptable optatives. In the rst not pt was not accepted, in the second not lv; and in the third not bs:
As the consequences of these quasi-complete scenarios are pairwise incompatible the well-founded scenario, being sceptical, is their meet in the semi-lattice of proposition 10, so that its avoidance set is the union of their avoidance sets.
De nition 12. The well-founded scenario of a program P with ICs is the meet of all quasi-complete scenarios wrt Opt in the semi-lattice of all base scenarios. For short we use WFS Opt to denote the well-founded scenario wrt Opt: Example 9. In example 5 WFS Opt = P fnot :ww; not fdg: Thus one can conclude:
fww; :nl; not :ww; not fdg i.e. no other hypothesis can be assumed for certain; everything is sceptically assumed faulty except for fd: This di ers from the result of WFS0, shown in example 2.
Example 10. Consider the statements: Let's go hiking if it is not known to rain; Let's go swimming if it is not known to rain; Let's go swimming if the water is not known to be cold; We cannot go both swimming and hiking. They render the set of rules P: ? hiking; swimming swimming not rain hiking not rain swimming not cold water and let Opt = fnot rain; not cold waterg: Complete scenarios wrt Opt are P fg; and P fnot cold waterg; where the latter is the well founded wrt Opt: It entails that swimming is true. Note that not rain is not assumed because it is optative to do so, and by assuming it contradiction would be unavoidable.
To obtain less sceptical complete scenarios wrt Opt, and in the spirit of partial stable models 24], we introduce:
De nition 13. Let P be an extended logic program with ICs, and let the wellfounded scenario of P wrt Opt be P H: P K is a partial scenario of P wrt Opt i it is a base scenario wrt Opt and H K: The rst is the WFS Opt (cf. example 9), which corresponds to the most sceptical view whereby all possibly relevant faults are assumed. The other extended scenarios represent, in contrast, all other alternative hypothetical presences and absences of faults still compatible with the wobbly wheel observation.
If a program is non-contradictory (i.e. its WFSX exists) then no matter which are the optatives, the well-founded semantics wrt Opt is always equal to the least complete scenario wrt fg (and so, ipso facto, equivalent to the WFSX). Theorem 14. If WFSX is de ned for a program P with an empty set of ICs then, for whatever Opt; WFS Opt is the least complete scenario of P:
For programs without explicit negation WFSX is equivalent to well-founded semantics of 26] (WFS).
Primacy in Optative Reasoning
Up to now no restriction was made regarding the optatives of programs. It is possible for optatives to be identi ed by the user along with the program, or for the user to rely on criteria for specifying the optatives, and expect the system to infer them from the program.
Next we identify a special class of optatives, governed by an important criterion 11, 4]: Exactly the hypotheses not depending on any others are optative. In diagnosis this criterion means hypothesizing as abnormal rst the causally deeper faults.
In taxonomies with exceptions this is not the desired preference criterion. To give priority to the most speci c default information only a hypothesis on which no other depends should be optative. This way the relinquishing of default hypotheses to avoid contradiction begins with less speci c ones.
The subject of de ning preference criteria to automatically determine optative hypotheses from programs is complex. It is closely related to that of preference among defaults 7] .
How to infer optatives for criteria di erent from the one above is left open.
Clearly every hypothesis which is not acceptable in P fg depends on the acceptance of some other hypothesis. In other words, if a hypothesis not L is acceptable in a scenario P H; but is not acceptable in P fg; this means that in order to make not L acceptable some other hypotheses S H have to be accepted too. Thus not L depends on the hypotheses of S; and the latter are more primal than not L: As a rst approximation we de ne the set of prime optative hypotheses as Acc(fg):
Example 13. In program P of example 12 Acc(fg) = fnot dg: So the only prime optative hypothesis is not d: Hypothesis not b is not prime optative because it is only acceptable once not d is accepted, otherwise not c constitutes evidence to the contrary.
In general, not all hypotheses in Acc(fg) though are independant of one another. Hence we must re ne our rst approximation to prime optatives. Then the optatives are Acc(fg) = fnot a; not b; not cg; and the WFS wrt Acc(fg) is P fnot b; not cg: However, it is clear from the program that only not c should be prime optative, since the acceptance of not b depends on the absence of conclusion c in P; but not vice-versa, and likewise regarding the acceptance of not a: Any de nition of a semantics based on the notions of scenarios and evidence alone cannot distinguish the optative primacy of not c; because it is insensitive to the groundedness of literals, viz. there being no rules for c; and thus its non-dependence on other hypotheses.
An asymmetry must be introduced, based on a separate new notion, to capture the causal directionality of inference implicit in logic program rules, as mentioned in the introduction:
De nition 15. A hypothesis not A 2 Acc(fg) is sensitive to a separate set of hypotheses not F in P i not A 6 2 Acc(P F): Note that F is a set of facts.
A hypothesis not A 2 Acc(fg) is prime optative i for all not S Acc(fg) if not A is sensitive to not S then an element of not S is sensitive to fnot Ag:
The set of prime optatives is denoted by POpt; and we refer to the wellfounded semantics wrt POpt as the prime optative semantics, or POS: Example 15. In example 14 the only prime optative is not c: For example, not a is not prime optative since not a is sensitive to fnot bg and not vice-versa. Example 16. In example 2, POpt = fnot bs; not pt; not lv; not fdg: Acc(fg) = POpt fnot ftg: However, not ft is not prime optative since it is sensitive to both fnot lvg and fnot ptg; but not vice-versa. Example 17. Consider P = fp not a; :p; a b; b a; not c; c not dg. Then Acc(fg) = fnot a; not b; not dg:
